Bickel's justification for judicial review began with the premise that "the good society not only will want to satisfy the immediate needs of the greatest number but also will strive to support and maintain enduring general values. 3 He proceeded to argue that "courts have certain capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislators and executives do not possess": 14 [M]any actions of government have .. unintended or unappreciated bearing on values we hold to have more general and permanent interest ....
[W]hen the pressure for immediate results is strong enough and emotions ride high enough, [legislators] will ordinarily prefer to act on expediency rather than take the long view . . . . Not merely respect for the rule of established principles but the creative establishment and renewal of a coherent body of principled rules-that is what our legislatures have proven themselves ill equipped to give us.
Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society ....
[Courts can] appeal to men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment's hue and cry .... 15
This does not establish "full consistency with democratic theory,"' 8 but it blunts the charge that judicial review is antidemocratic. " [I] f the process is properly carried out, an aspect of the current-not only the timeless, mystic-popular will will find expression in constitutional adjudication. The result may be a tolerable accommodation with the theory and practice of democracy."' 7 Despite his expansive description of the judicial function, Bickel's commitment to fundamental rights adjudication was ambivalent and coupled with a strong belief in judicial self-restraint.'" The contemporary proponents of fundamental rights adjudication tend to embrace his most expansive views. The critics emphasize the "countermajoritarian difficulty" and the need for restraint.
II. The Controversy over Methodology and the Source of Values
This part describes the internal discourse of the fundamental rights controversy. It begins with seven representative scholars who favor one or another form of fundamental rights adjudication. Although not all of the proponents approve of all the Supreme Court's fundamental rights decisions, they share the mission of justifying the Court's willingness to engage in this mode of adjudication. I treat the advocates of fundamental rights adjudication in two groups. The first consists of consensus or conventional morality theorists. Dean Harry Wellington of Yale believes that there are no fundamental rights as such, but only a conventional morality to he judicially ascertained and enforced. 19 Michael Perry of Ohio State articulates a similar theory but reaches significantly different results from Wellington. 2 0 The "rights" theorists in the second group-Laurence Tribe of Harvard, 21 Kenneth Karst of U.C.L.A., 22 J. Harvey Wilkinson and G. Edward White of Virginia, 23 and David A. J. Richards of New York University 24 -draw on a variety of sources to derive fundamental rights that enjoy some independence from conventional moral views.
In contrast to the profusion of articles supporting fundamental rights adjudication, the scholarly literature contains relatively few unsympathetic analyses. 25 I conclude by discussing the writings of the three most prominent critics of the practice: Raoul Berger, a Charles Wellington defines conventional morality as "standards of conduct which are widely shared in a particular society." 3 1 A society's conventional moral "principles" differ from its moral "ideals." Principles impose obligations; ideals are "a guide to the virtuous, inviting him 'to carry forward beyond the limited extent which duty demands.' "32
Although a society's ideals "help us understand how its moral principles apply in concrete situations," 3 3 judges are authorized to implement only its principles. To the claim that contemporary American society is too heterogeneous to share conventional moral principles, Wellington responds:
Although the sub-culture problem is real, too much can be made of it. Much of the cleavage that results from diversity manifests itself in interest group politics. Diverse groups can pursue different policies while sharing a basically common morality.
More important, the melting pot phenomenon is a real one .... The American people have a history and tradition which interact with their common problems to fashion attitudes, values, and aspirations that tend toward a dynamic, but nevertheless relatively cohesive, society, and that make it possible to discern a conventional morality. 3 4 To discern a society's conventional morality, one must live in the society, "become sensitive to it, experience widely, read extensively, and ruminate, reflect, and analyze situations that seem to call moral obligations into play. This task may be called the method of philosophy," 3 5 and it is not adequately performed by legislators:
The major difficulty for the official charged with the task of determining how the moral principles bear in a particular case is in disengaging himself from contemporary prejudices which are easily confused with moral principles. He must escape the passion of the moment and achieve an appropriately historical perspective ....
....
[L]egislators, of course, are often professionally concerned with morality . . . . But the environment in which legislators function makes difficult a bias-free perspective. It is often hard for law-makers to resist pressure from their constituents who react to particular events . . . with a passion that conflicts with common morality . . . . Nor is it an easy matter for legislators to find conventional morality when there are well-organized interest groups insisting upon moral positions of their own.
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By comparison, the process of adjudication "has some promise of filtering out the prejudices and passions of the moment, some promise of providing the judge with distance and a necessary historical perspective." 3 7 Discerning conventional morality differs radically from deriving rights independent of their basis in conventional morality. Wellington characterizes "fundamental rights" as a terminological mistake because it implies that those rights have a special status derived from the Constitution or imposed by the judge "as wise philosopher": 
36.
Id. at 248-49.
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Id. at 248. With virtually no discussion, Wellington dismisses the methods of behavioral science as too expensive and not up to the task of unpacking the complexities of moral issues. Id. at 247.
38. Id. at 299.
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The Yale Law Journal Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.' Ncur does it enact Mr. John Rawls's A Theory of Justice." 3 0 Rather, "It]he Court's task is to ascertain the weight of the principle in conventional morality and to convert the moral principle into a legal one by connecting it with the body of constitutional law." 40 Wellington applies this approach to the regulation of contraception and abortion. I pass over the first, noting only that he approves of Griswold because the Connecticut anticontraceptive law interfered with the conventionally rooted intimacy of the marital relationship, 41 but finds Eisenstadt problematic because he doubts whether a consensus protects the sexual intimacy of unmarried couples. 42 Wellington introduces the abortion issue by establishing the principle that "every person has a right (qualified by context) to decide what happens in or to his body." 43 He posits a hypothetical statute making it a crime to remove a person's gall bladder except to save her life. The law "deprives any person with a diseased gall bladder of his or her liberty without due process of law" because it imposes physical and psychological pain. 44 Although the state has no conceivable interest in insuring the survival of diseased gall bladders, Wellington argues that this is not true of the survival of fetuses. The analogy therefore does not establish that a woman has a constitutional right to an abortion if it will cause the death of the fetus.
Wellington argues that conventional morality nonetheless permits abortion if the fetus was conceived through rape. His analysis proceeds from an example devised by the philosopher Judith Thomson: 45 You are kidnapped and taken to a hospital where a famous violinist who has a fatal kidney ailment is plugged into your circulatory system. If he is disconnected, he will die; otherwise, at the end of nine months he will be cured and you will be unplugged, inconvenienced but unharmed. "Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to that situation?" 4 6 Thomson answers "no," and Wellington agrees that this is "the only answer that can be defended by an appeal to our attitudes and practices." 47 The fact that a majority of states permitted abortions to preserve the mother's life shows that this practice was also supported by conventional morality. But Wellington believes that Roe v. Wade went too far in permitting abortions to preserve the mother's physical or mental health. To be sure, the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code would permit such abortions, and the ALI is "some evidence of society's moral position on these questions. It is indeed better evidence than state legislation, for the Institute, while not free of politics, is not nearly as-subject to the pressures of special interest groups as is a legislature." 4 The Institute's recommendation does not reflect social consensus, however: "I do not understand how, by noticing commonly held attitudes, one can conclude that a healthy fetus is less important than a sick mother." ' 5 0 Dean Wellington's source of values for constitutional adjudication is conventional morality elucidated by intuitionistic reasoning. By intuitionistic reasoning, I refer to the method of testing a posited outcome (e.g., "a woman has a right to abort a fetus conceived by rape") by comparing it to seemingly analogous situations about which the decisionmaker has clear intuitions (the kidnapped person needn't stay hooked up to the violinist). Philosophers and lawyers often argue about moral and legal principles in this manner. 5 1 In effect, Wellington employs it as a device for interpolating between conventional moral principles to apply them to particular situations.
Michael Perry. For Professor Perry, as for Dean Wellington, the Court's task is limited to ascertaining and enforcing conventional morality. 52 Judicial review is designed "to correct the occasional myopia, to moderate the occasional excesses of the political processes": 5 3 49. id. at 311. 50. Id. 51. Of course, the writer takes the chance that the reader will not share her intuition or that, because the mind-experiment is so far removed from the reader's experience, he will not feel much confidence in the validity of the intuition. Fervent minority lobbying and bartering is not wrong in a pluralist democracy. But when trying to ascertain the content of the public morals, it simply will not do to pretend that minority success is a conclusive index of conventional moral culture.5 4 In performing its function, the Court should look to "cases establishing relevant 'first principles'; cases involving related or analogous issues; evidence indicating a shift in the moral culture, such as recently enacted legislation dealing with an aspect of the issue before the Court; or credible studies of shifts in contemporary social attitudes": 55 Ultimately, however, each individual Justice... must ask whether particularized claims about that culture resonate with him or her. The Justices, after all, are not unfamiliar with conventional mores and attitudes; in truth it is unlikely that a very unconventional person would become a Justice of the Supreme Court. The collectivity which is the Supreme Court is, in this sense, a jury, and as a matter of political reality the Court is a jury that generally will reflect and mediate the temper of the dominant political and moral culture. 58 Perry's inquiry differs from Wellington's in two significant respects. First, Perry is explicitly concerned with "public morality": The relevant question is "not whether the conduct is disapproved by conventional morality, but whether conventional morality supports state enforcement of its disapproval through criminal and civil sanctions. " -with the ultimate objective of identifying "those attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood." 0 3 In contrast to Wellington and Perry, Tribe explicitly rejects the limitations of social consensus:
[A]ttempts to ground constitutional rights of privacy or personhood in conventional morality.., are helpful but have inherently limited power. For we are talking, necessarily, about rights of individuals or groups against the larger community, and against the majority . . . . Subject to all of the perils of antimajoritarian judgment, courts-and all who take seriously their constitutional oaths-must ultimately define and defend rights against government in terms independent of consensus or majority will." 4 Kenneth Karst seeks to establish a freedom of "intimate association," which he defines as "a close and familiar personal relationship with another that is in some significant way comparable to a marriage or a family relationship." 6 5 Karst links the freedom of intimate association to other domains of constitutional doctrine, especially to the equal protection clause: Wilkinson and White argue for a freedom of "lifestyle choices," which they expressly limit to matters of "domestic companionship, sexual conduct, and personal appearance."
67 These "choices themselves are intimate"; "for the most part [they] involve little prospect of direct or intentional harm to others"; and they are indispensable "in fulfilling individuality." 6 1 8 Although the authors acknowledge that "lifestyle freedoms are not expressly safeguarded" by the Constitution, they write that "the spirit of the Constitution operates to protect them": 6 9
A compelling mission of the Constitution has been to protect sanctuaries of individual behavior from the hands of the state ....
[T]he Bill of Rights teaches that human dignity is meaningless without a proper measure of personal freedom from governmental interference.
That dignity is seriously diminished unless it includes those choices that most express our uniqueness and individuality. By our style of dress and appearance, our personal associations, our manner of speech, and our sexual behavior we seek to express our uniqueness as humans and to realize our destinies as individual This principle explains and justifies the sense in which the constitutional right to privacy is a right. The constitutional concept expresses an underlying moral principle resting on the enhancement of sexual autonomy, the self-determination of the role of sexuality in one's life which protects the values foundational to the concept of human rights, equal concern and respect for autonomy. Accordingly, in the absence of countervailing moral argument, laws which determine how one will have sex and with what consequences are constitutionally invalid. Our "constitutional morality" acorporates these principles and, by contrast to conventional morality, is subject to the metaethical constraints of moral reasoning. It follows that not everything invoked by democratic majorities as justified by "public morality" is, in fact, morally justified. From the moral point of view, we must always assess such claims by whether they can be sustained by the underlying structure of moral reasoning . . . . In this regard, constitutional morality is at one with the moral point of view. 78 b. Competing Interests. The Court and proponents of fundamental rights adjudication do not regard constitutional rights as absolutely protected under every conceivable circumstance; they are defeasible by strong legitimate governmental interests. Wellington and Perry do not engage in the accommodation or balancing of interests, for the conventional moral view on any particular issue already reflects the balance of competing interests. By contrast, the rights theorists directly address the legitimacy and strength of justifications for interfering with fundamental rights. The two most prominent justifications are promoting public morality and protecting the institutions of marriage and the family.
Tribe's only comment on promoting morality is that "no unconventional form of consensual human sexuality can be excluded from the protected sphere solely on the ground that it is thought by the majority not to draw on the historically deepest wellsprings of human emotions and instincts." 79 Although he assumes that the state may legitimately seek to protect and strengthen marriages, he doubts that this interest suffices to sustain most regulations of sexual conduct 8 0 78. Id. at 977. In discussing Rawls's concept of a "reflective equilibrium," Dworkin emphasizes that where a particular intuition conflicts with general principles to which one adheres, one must act on principle and not ignore the contradiction in the faith that a more sophisticated set of principles will eventually be discovered that will reconcile the conflict. See [T]he stereotypical "family unit" that is so much a part of our constitutional rhetoric is becoming decreasingly central to our constitutional reality. Such "exercises of familial rights and responsibilities" as remain prove to be individual powers to resist governmental determination of who shall be born, with whom one shall live, and what values shall be transmitted. This shift might well represent an irresistible corollary of changes in the structure of American family life and social and cultural existence. Whatever its cause, the issue it raises most sharply is the recurring puzzle of liberal individualism: Once the State, whether acting through its courts or otherwise, has "liberated" the child-and the adult-from the shackles of such intermediate groups as family, what is to defend Karst writes that, although freedom of intimate association "does not imply that the state is wholly disabled from promoting majoritarian views of morality,""' the state may not invoke this legitimate objective as an excuse to "prevent the expression of a particular idea, or ... some harm that it fears will flow from the expressive aspects of the conduct .... ,"2 Karst suggests that most laws regulating intimate association are impermissibly concerned "to regulate the content of messages about sexual preference." 8' 3 He also implies that the state has no significant interest in protecting the family beyond the wishes of its members.
Wilkinson and White find the general promotion of morality a weak justification for regulating lifestyles:
The privilege of living in a free and open society entails . . . some obligation to tolerate ideas and moral choices with which one disagrees . . . . Moreover, to uphold legal proscriptions on grounds of abstract morality would permit the state to ferret out and ultimately to try and punish offenders upon the assertion, not that the given behavior was socially harmful, but that it was revolting and unnatural. Such a rule of law would invite the majority to act upon its least noble and most prejudiced impulses. 8 4 On the other hand, they urge that [family life has been a central unifying experience throughout American society. Preserving the strength of this basic, organic unit is a central and legitimate end of the police power. The state ought to be concerned that if allegiance to traditional family arrangements declines, society as a whole may well suffer. The state's "proper concern derives from the basic functions performed by 'family' units in society: from sexual fulfillment and reproduction, to education and rearing of the young, to economic support and emotional security. Richards believes that there is "n. constitutional objection to prohibiting clearly immoral acts that threaten the existence of society. 's7 But enforcing mere conventional morality "is incompatible with the moral theory of human rights implicit in the constitutional order." ' , For the same reason, Richards believes that the state may not require conformity to any particular notion of the family unit. 9 c. Applications. All of the rights theorists find Griswold and Eisenstadt easy cases, and they ultimately approve of Roe v. Wade. Their treatment of laws punishing homosexual conduct illuminates some differences in their approaches.
Tribe believes that private consensual homosexual conduct should be protected because it "is central to the personal identities of those singled out by the state's law." 90 He concedes that the "history of homosexuality has been largely a history of disapproval and disgrace." However, it makes all the difference in the world what level of generality one employs to test the pedigree of an asserted liberty claim .... It is crucial, in asking whether an alleged right forms part of a traditional liberty, to define the liberty at a high enough level of generality to permit unconventional variants to claim protection along with mainstream versions of protected conduct ....
[T]he tradition of respecting the intimate noncoercive sexual actions of others.., provides an umbrella capacious enough to subsume homosexual as well as heterosexual variants. 91 For Richards argues that homosexual conduct is not immoral 99 and doubts that its legalization would have any significant effect on normal family life. 10 0 "In any event," he concludes, "it is difficult to understand how the state has the right, on moral grounds, to protect heterosexual love at the expense of homosexual love. Equal concern and respect for autonomous choice seem precisely to forbid the kind of calculation that this sort of sacrifice contemplates." 1 0 '
The rights theorists invoke many of the same sources of values that the consensus theorists employ to ascertain conventional morality. A consensus theorist, however, is more immediately constrained by conventional morality. If Wellington's Court determines that conventional morality permits the punishment of homosexual conduct, it must uphold the legislation. A rights theorist looks to conventional morality as a nonexclusive guide to defining the breadth and contours of higher level moral principles. Once articulated, these prin- ciples operate independently of particular conventional views and may even invalidate laws that are supported by a strong contrary consensus. 102 Although Perry characterizes himself as a conventional moralist, his willingness to hold society to its relatively abstract conventional "ideals" aligns him more with the rights theorists than with Wellington.
B. The Critics
In Democracy and Distrust, 103 John Hart Ely criticizes seven possible approaches to fundamental rights adjudication: the judge's own values, neutral principles, predicting progress, natural law, reason, consensus, and tradition. 104 Because no contemporary proponent of fundamental rights adjudication relies on the first three approaches, 1 5 I restrict my comments to Ely's discussions of natural law and reason, directed mainly against the rights theorists, and his critiques of theories based on consensus and tradition. I then consider two other criticisms of fundamental rights adjudication: Robert Bork's argument that the choice of the level of abstraction on which to discern rights is inherently arbitrary, and Raoul Berger's claim that fundamental rights adjudication is prohibited by the text and original understanding of the Constitution.
The Critique of Rights Theories
Ely's critique of rights theories begins with two historical points. He disputes the claim, made by some proponents, that fundamental rights adjudication is heir to a natural law tradition that has been virtually unbroken since the eighteenth century; 10 6 and he shows 105. Ely argues againt the view that the judge "should use his or her own values to measure the judgment of the political branches." Id. at 44. Although this position is "seldom endorsed in so many words," he suggests that the application of supposedly objective methodologies often comes down to the imposition of the judge's own values.
Ely also argues that the concept of neutral principles, proposed by Herbert Wechsler as a constraint on all modes of constitutional decisionmaking, does "not provide a source of substantive content." Id. at 55.
Finally, in The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, Alexander Bickel suggested that the Warren Court had tried, and failed, to decide cases according to values it believed would be accepted in the future. See A. BicKEL, supra note 18. Ely suggests that "there was a good deal of prescription folded into Bickel's description," and comments that the Court is incompetent to predict the future and that there is no justification for " [ First, he doubts the "alleged in-ompatibility between popular input on moral questions and 'correct' moral judgment."'1 14 On the contrary, "our moral sensors function best under the pressure of experience. Most of us did not fully wake up to the immorality of our most recent war until we were shown pictures of Vietnamese children being scalded by American napalm." 1 5 I find this argument unpersuasive. Granting that a moral judgment is sounder when informed by experience, it also seems more secure after we assimilate the events-after we recollect them in tranquillity -than in their very midst. In any case, Ely's example is not equivalent to the experience of either legislatures or courts. If, however, his point is that our moral sensors respond better to the plights of actual individuals than to abstractions, why are legislators, prescribing the conduct of anonymous people, better situated than courts hearing actual cases?"", Second, Ely argues that judicial reasoning results in a "systematic bias in ... [ 
The Critique of Consensus-a~zd Tradition-Based Theories
Ely writes that the "idea that society's 'widely shared values' should give content to the Constitution's open-ended provisions . . . turns out to be at the core of most 'fundamental values' positions. " 12 2 Certainly it is at the core of Wellington's and Perry's and plays a role in most rights theories as well.
Ely doubts that American society shares a conventional morality, 1"2 3 and argues that even if it did, the consensus is "not reliably discoverable, at least not by courts": 1 2 4 "The more concrete the allusions to this allegedly timeless moral agreement, the less convincing they become. Therefore, to make their case the proponents of objective value must restrict themselves to a few abstract ideals whose vagueness allows almost any interpretation . . ." [B]y viewing society's values through one's own spectacles ... one can convince oneself that some invocable consensus supports almost any position a civilized person might want to see supported.
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Ely makes a similar point about the indeterminacy and manipulability of tradition, which "can be invoked in support of almost any cause. ' 
The Levels-of-Abstraction Problem and the Balancing of Competing Interests
Ely underscores his argument against tradition as a source for constitutional values by noting the "understandable temptation to vary the relevant tradition's level of abstraction to make it come out right." 12 1
8 The levels-of-abstraction problem is pervasive, infecting theories of adjudication based on rights and consensus as well as tradition.
For example, Professor Bork criticizes Griswold on the ground that the Court's choice of the level on which to define the protected liberty was necessarily arbitrary. He notes that the Court surely did not adopt the very broad principle that "government may not interfere with any acts done in private." 129 On the other hand, for the Court to define the principle narrowly--"government may not prohibit the use of contraceptives by married couples"-presents problems of "neutral definition": 13 0
Why does the principle extend only to married couples? Why, out of all forms of sexual behavior, only to the use of contraceptives? Why, out of all forms of behavior, only to sex? ' .
To put the matter another way, if a neutral judge must demonstrate why principle X applies to cases A and B but not to case C . . ., he must, by the same token, also explain why the principle is defined as X, rather than as X minus, which would cover A but not cases B and C, or as X plus, which would cover all cases, A, B, and C.131 This is a powerful criticism. For example, does Judith Thomson's tale of the violinist 3 2 establish an absolute right to terminate all nonconsensual life-supporting dependencies under all conceivable circumstances? Or does the right depend on the unwilling benefactor's particular relationship to the beneficiary (e.g., strangers, mother-child) and on the severity of the imposition? Does Karst's and Richards's principle of equal respect protect all consensual sexual activity or only sex within a loving intimate association? It may be ... that the "right to an abortion," or noneconomic rights generally, accord more closely with "this generation's idealization of America" than the "rights" asserted in . . . Lochner ... . But that attitude, of course, is precisely the point of the Lochner philosophy, which would grant unusual protection to those "rights" that somehow seem most pressing, regardless of whether the Constitution suggests any special solicitude for them.
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Lochner is so evocative because we think the Court enforced the wrong values. (It is difficult to imagine Griswold playing the same symbolic role.) Implicit in Ely's charge of "Lochnering" 144 is the claim that "the closer the Court has come to overt fundamental-values reasoning the less impressively it has performed.' 45 To pursue this critique would require reference to criteria-which Ely and Bork deny exist146-for determining the correctness of judicially enforced values. Whether or not the Court's record can be evaluated, however,
47
Lochner remains an embarrassment for proponents of fundamental rights adjudication and cause for skepticism about the practice. Tribe writes:
Part of what was wrong with Lochner was the Court's overconfidence, both in its own factual notions about working conditions and perhaps also in its own normative convictions about the meaning of liberty; at least by the 1920's, if not yet in 1905, the Court should probably have paid more heed to the mounting agreement, if not the consensus, that the economic "freedom" it was protecting was more myth than reality. 48 But if, in retrospect, the Lochner Court was overconfident about its notion of economic liberty in the face of, a mounting agreement to the contrary, how should the proponents' Court respond to the apparent ascendency of a "moral majority"?
The Text and Original Understanding
Fundamental rights adjudication is open to the criticisms that it is not authorized and not guided by the text and original history of the Constitution. Among the critics, only Raoul Berger rests his case exclusively on the lack of authorization. Explaining the scope of his argument, Berger writes:
Nor will I deal with whether or not judicial review is antidemocritarian, for if judicial review of the Warrenite scope was "authorized" by the Constitution, its antidemocratic nature has constitutional sanction.... What is of paramount importance... is that the Court "is under obligation to trace its premises to the charter from which it derives its authority . . . ." [T] he "subjectivity" involved in making value choices plays no role in my view of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ....149
Berger's condemnation of fundamental rights adjudication is incidental to an attack on virtually every significant decision under the Fourteenth Amendment-including Brown v. Board of Education2 5 --as inconsistent with the adopters' limited intent to incorporate the Civil Rights Act of 1866 into the Constitution. The academic response to Berger has focused on his analysis of the equal protection clause, arguing that it is methodologically and factually problematic. 15 ' If the Court's race decisions are deeply rooted in the text and original history of the Constitution, however, fundamental rights adjudication seems less secure. Indeed, the proponents' originalist claims tend to be perfunctory at best. 52 149. R. BmtoEz, supra note 26, at 284-85 (quoting Ely, supra note 143, at 949) (footnotes omitted).
150 152. For example, though Wellington writes that "the power of judicial review can be exercised only when the principle the Court employs is related to constitutional text," Wellington, supra note 19, at 267, he never discloses the textual basis for his consensus theory. Richards also implies that fundamental rights adjudication is grounded in the text of the Constitution, but does not specify its textual basis. Richards, Sexual Autonomy, supra note 24, at 963-64. The proponents' claims of authority from the original understanding tend to be conclusory and oblique. For example, Perry writes:
The Founding Fathers and, "perhaps by emulation," those who were responsible for the fourteenth amendment, intended that the specific content of the vague, ethical norms of the Constitution, including due process, remain to some extent an open question to be answered by each generation, for each generation ....
[
I]t
Ironically, Ely is quite ready tn acknowledge the originalist credentials of fundamental rights adjudication:
[T]he most plausible interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is, as it must be, the one suggested by its languagethat it was a delegation to future constitutional decision-makers to protect certain rights that the document neither lists, at least not exhaustively, nor even in any specific way gives directions for finding. If a principled approach to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's open-ended provisions cannot be developed, one that is not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to representative democracy, responsible commentators must consider seriously the possibility that courts simply should stay away from them.
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Bork likewise is concerned with the absence of guidance. From the premise that all values are intrinsically subjective, he concludes:
Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other. The judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights. 1 57 This, then, is the controversy over the sources of fundamental rights and the methods for ascertaining them. The critics are, of course, right simply will not do to suggest that those who choose to maintain and apply the [public welfare] limit... are acting without any constitutional basis.... mhe idea that due process imposes a public welfare limit on the police power is a recurrent, Even assuming that general principles can be found in social consensus or derived by moral reasoning, the application of those principles is highly indeterminate and subject to manipulation. The point is partly illustrated by disagreements among theorists employing essentially the same methodology: Wilkinson would uphold sodomy laws, while White, Karst, Tribe, and Richards would strike them down; both Wilkinson and White would uphold adultery laws, 158 while Tribe finds them constitutionally doubtful. 159 Even when the scholars are in substantial agreement, however, their conclusions are not obviously determined by their sources and methods. And, ironically, the more sensitive a judge is to the complexities of the social values at stake, the greater the indeterminacy, the scope of discretion, and opportunity for manipulation. 16 0
III. The Critics Against Themselves
The critics are not merely critics. They have their own theories, which encompass a range of alternatives to fundamental rights adjudication: Raoul Berger and Robert Bork are both originalists-the former a "strict intentionalist," the latter a constrained "moderate originalist." 161 John Ely proposes a substantially nonoriginalist approach to judicial review, limited to the purpose of ensuring the integrity and representativeness of the legislative process.
I shall argue that none of the critics' affirmative theories can withstand the force of his own criticisms. This casts a somewhat different light on the conclusions of the preceding section and begins to il-
See
Wilkinson & White, sup-a note 23, at 599. 159. See L. TimE, supra note 21, at 946. 160. Consider, for example, the difficulties of heeding Tribe's caution that a court must decide, in this society and at this time, whether a person's choice to act or think in a certain way should be fundamentally protected against coercion by law, recognizing that the alternative in some situations may be coercion by economic or peer pressure and, in others, more meaningfully undominated choice. And to add to the difficulty of the task: neither judges nor legislators nor citizens should permit decisions of this kind, focused as each must be upon its precise context, to be taken without attention to the drift of their cumulative result. Those charged with the responsibility of choice must avoid too myopic an adherence to the matter at hand, recognizing that the ultimate results of incremental change might be wholly alien, and perhaps profoundly objectionable, to those who acquiesce step by step. Id. at 892.
161. See Brest, supra note 6, at 222-24 (defining these terms).
luminate the contradictions inher ,nt in the fundamental rights controversy.
A. Raoul Berger's Strict Intentionalism
For Berger, the only relevant question is how the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment would have decided a particular case had it arisen in 1868.162 He is not concerned with their interpretive ir.-tentions (the canons of construction by which they intended their provisions to be interpreted) or with the level of abstraction on which they intended their provisions to be read-for example, whether they intended only to establish general principles or, at the other extreme, to bind future interpreters to their particular views on each issue that might arise under the provision. e3 Berger's indifference to interpretive intent and the intended level of abstraction undermines the very premise of his theory-the obligation of fidelity to the adopters' intentions-by confusing their intentions with their mere personal views.'6 There is no reason to suppose that the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended its provisions to be interpreted by Berger's strict intentionalist canons. If they adverted to the matter at all, the adopters more likely intended a textualist approach such as the "plain meaning rule."' 165 Thus, fidelity to their intentions may require an interpreter to eschew detailed inquiry into the adopters' particular views and look instead to the text, perhaps understood in the light of their general purposes in enacting the provision. 0 6 6
In fact, we cannot determine the adopters' interpretive intent and often cannot even discover their substantive views with much particularity. Like other formalist strategies, strict intentionalism pretends to constrain constitutional decisionmaking while inviting, if not demanding, arbitrary manipulation of sources and outcomes.
B. Robert Bork's Constrained Moderate Originalism
Robert Bork believes that all constitutional adjudication must proceed from the text and purposes of particular provisions, but his approach is more expansive than Berger's. For example, Bork approves of Brown. He writes that, although the Court cannot ascertain the precise intentions of the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is one thing the Court does know: it was intended to enforce the core idea of black equality against government discrimination. And the Court, because it must be neutral, cannot pick and choose between competing gratifications and, likewise, cannot write the detailed code the framers omitted, requiring equality in this case but not in another. The Court must, for that reason, choose a general principle of equality that applies to all cases. 16 7 Bork requires the Court to adopt a "general principle of equality," not because the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment require it-they obviously don't-but to prevent the Justices from imposing their own value choices. The very adoption of such a principle, however, demands an arbitrary choice among levels of abstrac tion. Just what is "the general principle of equality that applies to all cases"? Is it the "core idea of black equality" that Bork finds in the original understanding (in which case Alan Bakke did not state a constitutionally cognizable claim), 1 68 or a broader principle of "racial equality" (so that, depending on the precise content of the principle, Bakke might have a case after all), or is it a still broader principle of equality that encompasses discrimination on the basis of gender (or sexual orientation) as well?' 6 ' Why, as Bork asks in his discussion of Griswold, X rather than X minus or X plus?1 7°B ork encounters the same difficulty in his attempt to limit the protection of the First Amendment to "explicitly political speech" rather than, say, "speech."' 7 ' The fact is that all adjudication requires Products, 73 that the judiciary should actively scrutinize legislation (1) "which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" or (2) which is based on "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." Ely's thesis is that, unlike an approach geared to the judicial imposition of "fundamental values," the representation-reinforcing orientation . . . is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary is entirely suppor- Kalven's "invitation to follow a dialectic progression from public official to government policy to public policy to matters in the public domain": I agree that there is an analogy between criticism of official behavior and the publication of a novel like Ulysses, for the latter may form attitudes that ultimately affect politics. But it is an analogy, not an identity. Other human activities and experiences also form personality, teach and create attitudes just as much as does the novel .... If the dialectical progression is not to become an analogical stampede, the protection of the first amendment must be cut off when it reaches the outer limits of political speech. Id. at 27. Bork therefore would draw the line at "explicitly political speech." But if there exist plausible alternative theories of free expression, or alternative applications of his theory, then his criterion fails his own test of neutrality. Professor Scanlon offers an alternative theory premised on a notion of individual autonomy that treats each person Ely approves of the Court's reapportionment and other voting-rights decisions; he urges the broad protection of political expression; and he argues for vigorous scrutiny of classifications that disadvantage politically powerless minorities. Ely's theory of suspect classifications, the book's most significant affirmative contribution, is vulnerable to the same criticisms that he finds fatal to fundamental rights adjudication-vulnerable precisely because it turns out to be a fundamental rights theory, albeit somewhat disguised.
75
Under Ely's theory, essentially any law disadvantaging a discrete and insular minority that is the object of prejudice is "suspect" and therefore invalid unless it closely "fits" legitimate governmental objectives. 170 This strict scrutiny is justified by two features of prejudice: (1) prejudice is intrinsically wrong-"[t]o disadvantage a group essentially out of dislike is surely to deny its members equal concern and respect"; 17 7 and (2) prejudice distorts legislators' assessments of the costs and benefits of proposed decisions because it induces them to overestimate both the validity of stereotypes disfavoring minorities and the costs of more individualized treatment. 7 8 Ely asserts that judicial intervention in these cases promotes "participation." He grudgingly concedes that participation may be a value but claims that it 174. J. ELY, supra note 7, at 101-02. Curiously, he criticizes consensus theories, which are also designed to remedy defects of representative process, on the ground that "it makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority." Id. at 69.
175. Note that Ely's Court must make some value choices even apart from the suspect classification theory, simply in order to protect electoral participation and freedom of expression. For example, it must decide just how representative a government must be and who should be included in the political community. Compare Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (Douglas, J.) (striking down poll tax) with id. at 686 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court must also balance representation-reinforcing interests against competing social interests, such as preventing riots and espionage, and ensuring that voters possess adequate maturity, loyalty, and interest in the outcome. Even assuming that participation is a privileged value, however, 180 Ely's theory still requires the court to make unprivileged value choices.1 8 ' Ely asserts that a legislature may not disadvantage people merely because it dislikes them. This sounds like fundamental rights talk. Certainly, a hard-core utilitarian could not distinguish gratifying th. majority's hostile (or altruistic) desires from gratifying their aesthetic, moral, or any other kinds of desires. 8 2 Ely's equal protection theory would collapse, however, if gratifying the majority's dislike for a racial minority were treated as legitimate. At the same time, Ely wishes to permit the legislature to act hostilely toward groups such as burglars. 8 3 To maintain this distinction. Ely argues that, although gratifying the majority's dislike is not a legitimate goal, satisfying its moral beliefs is perfectly permissible. This is where things get tricky. For example, Ely believes that laws disadvantaging homosexuals are suspect because homosexuals are the objects of widespread prejudice. 8 4 But he would permit a legislature to punish homosexual conduct "due to a bona fide feeling that it is immoral": 8 5 This doesn't mean that simply by incanting "immorality" a state can be permitted successfully to defend a law that in fact was motivated by a desire simply to injure a disfavored group of persons.
179.
If the objection is . . . that one might well "value" certain decision procedures for their own sake, of course it is right: one might. And to one who insisted on that terminology, my point would be that the "values" the Court should pursue are "participational values" of the sort I have mentioned, since those are the "values" (1) with which our Constitution has preeminently and most successfully concerned itself, (2) whose "imposition" is not incompatible with, but on the contrary supports, the American system of representative democracy, and (3) that courts set apart from the political process are uniquely suited to "impose." Id. at 75 n.* See also pp. 1102-04 infra (constrained utilitarian argument for representation-reinforcing judicial review).
180. I am not persuaded by the arguments quoted in the preceding footnote. The claim that the Constitution is preeminently concerned with participational values is based on a selective and idiosyncratic reading of the document. See Lynch, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 859-62 (1980). In any case, participation is only half the story of democracy, the other half being the protection of individual rights. See pp. 1096-1105 infra.
181. For a more detailed discussion of some of the points that follow, see Brest, supra note 8.
182. Indeed, Ely criticizes Dworkin for excluding "external preferences" from his utilitarian calculus. . .. The question... reduces to whether the claim is credible that the prohibition in question was generated by a sincerely held moral objection to the act (or anything else that transcends a simple desire to injure the parties involved). 86 Ely forgets that racial segregation and antimiscegenation laws, as well as stereotypical gender classifications, have often been based-perhaps often sincerely-on the supposed immorality of racial intermingling and intermarriage, or of women not fulfilling their missions as mothers and wives. In short, a "conscientious objection" exception for discrimination based on our moral beliefs poses nearly the same threat to Ely's theory as treating dislike and hostility as legitimate objectives. The theory also presents methodological difficulties. When the government defends a law on moral grounds, the Court must determine whether the belief is actually "moral" and, if so, how "sincerely" it is held. Ely does not suggest how this can be done, and for good reason: In his critique of fundamental rights adjudication he denies that consensus exists on such questions and asserts that a court can identify moral beliefs only by employing dubious "laundering de-
Although the fundamental rights proponents' and critics' theories of constitutional adjudication presented in this article are not exhaustive, they are broadly representative. The proponents span the range of nonoriginalist adjudication; Berger and Bork typify the strategies of strict and moderate originalism; and Ely's representation-reinforcing theory lies within a tradition of process-oriented modes of judicial review. 18 8 186. Id.
187.
Such techniques are evident in the work of consensus theorists generally, and are sometimes made explicit. Ronald Dworkin argues that community values must be refined by the judge in a way that removes prejudice, emotional reaction, rationalization, and "parroting," and in addition should be tested for sincerity and consistency .... [Wellington writes that] courts "must be reasonably confident that they draw on conventional morality and screen out contemporary bias, passion, and prejudice, or indeed, that they distinguish cultivated taste from moral obligation." Id. at 67 n.0 (citations omitted).
My point so far is not that any c.F these theories are untenable, but that all are vulnerable to similar criticisms based on their indeterminacy, manipulability, and, ultimately, their reliance on judicial value choices that cannot be "objectively" derived from text, history, consensus, natural rights, or any other source. No theory of constitutional adjudication can defend itself against self-scrutiny. Each critic's assessment of the alternative theories seems rather like an aes thetic judgment issued from the Warsaw Palace of Culture. 8 9 At this point, a partisan of representative democracy might be tempted to discard judicial review entirely, or retreat to the extraordinarily permissive standards of the minimum rationality tests. 19 0 The following section argues, however, that abandoning a rights-oriented theory of judicial review is as problematic as any alternative.
IV. The Contradictions of Madisonian Democracy
In discussing what he terms the dilemma of Madisonian democracy,1 9 ' Professor Bork brings us closer to the central issue of the fundamental rights controversy:
A Madisonian system is not completely democratic, if by "democratic" we mean completely majoritarian. It assumes that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule for no better reason [than] that they are majorities.... The model also has a countermajoritarian premise, however, for it assumes that there are some areas of life a majority should not control. There are some things a majority should not do to us no matter how democratically it decides to do them. These are areas properly left to individual freedom, and coercion by the majority in these aspects of life is tyranny. Some see the model as containing an inherent, perhaps an insoluble, dilemma. Majority tyranny occurs if legislation invades the areas properly left to individual freedom. Minority tyranny occurs if the majority is prevented from ruling where its power is legitimate. Yet, quite obviously, neither the majority nor minority can be trusted to define the freedom of the other. The parties to the fundamental rights controversy resolve the tension between majority rule and minority rights in divergent ways. This section argues that their resolutions are determined by the ways they frame the issues in the first instance, and that the Madisonian dilemma is in fact unresolvable.
Ely echoes Alexander Bickel's characterization of judicial review as a "deviant institution in the American democracy," 193 while some proponents treat the state's infringement of individual rights as at least as deviant in a constitutional democracy. For example, David Richards applauds the "intrinsically countermajoritarian" nature of judicial review as an acknowledgment of "ideas of human rights that, by definition, government has no moral title to transgress." 1 9 4
Their different premises explain why Ely and Richards reach opposite conclusions. But what underlies the premises themselves? Ely and Bork profess to be Madisonian democrats, not populist majoritarians. Why, then, do they view judicial review as "deviant" rather than as integral to the democratic order? And why do the proponents ignore or give so little weight to majoritarian decisionmaking? Jesse Choper's recent book, Judicial Review and the National Political Process, 9 5 makes transparent some recurring confusions about democracy, and thus helps illuminate these questions.
Professor Choper's "major theme is that although judicial review is incompatible with a fundamental precept of American democracy--majority rule-the Court must exercise this power in order to protect individual rights, which are not adequately represented in the political processes." 1 96 Initially, he equates democracy with pure majoritarianism;' 9 7 he asserts that "the federal judiciary... is the least democratic of the three branches" 198 and that judicial review is "[n]ot merely antimajoritarian . . . [but] seems to cut directly against the grain of traditional democratic philosophy."' 99 Choper then acknowledges a Madisonian concept of democracy, which includes some restraints on majority rule. 20 0 One might hence argue that the Court "constitutes 'a working part of the democratic political life of the nation' because the power of judicial review has been historically exercised to restrain the majority from impinging on the constitutionally designated liberties of the individual, thus to assure those ultimate values that are integral to democracy." 2 0 ' Choper counters:
The difficulty with this position is that it commingles substance with procedure. The Supreme Court does advance democratic values by rejecting political action that threatens individual liberty ....
But irrespective of the content of its decisions, the process of judicial review is not democratic because the Court is not a politically responsible institution. . . . Although the Supreme Court may play a vital role in the preservation of the American democratic system, the procedure of judicial review is in conflict with the fundamental principle of democracy -majority rule under conditions of political freedom. Choper also rejects the "most sophisticated" argument, that "the socalled political branches . . . are by no means as democratic as standard belief would hold and that the Court is much more subject to the popular will than conventional wisdom would grant." 203 All things considered, "the Supreme Court is not as democratic as the Congress or President, and the institution of judicial review is not as majoritarian as the lawmaking process." 20 4
A. The Choice Between a Systemic and a Particularistic
Perspective and Some Problems of the Second Best Choper is pervasively ambiguous about whether the criterion of "being democratic" is applicable to an entire political system or to particular institutions within it. Although he suggests that judicial review might promote democracy by protecting individual rights, he continues to voice the concern that "the Court" and "judicial review" are "the least democratic" of our political institutions. (It is as if, having concluded that the Federal Reserve Bank contributes to the overall efficiency of the economy, one continued to worry that the Fed, as such, is "uneconomic.") this vacillation between systemic and particularistic perspectives responds to a fantasy most of us hold, that each isolated actor and action within a complex social system will reflect the essence of the system-as each fragment of a hologram contains the entire image. Phenomenologically, we find it difficult to grasp the whole and its parts simultaneously; so we move back and forth between them, denying one as we embrace the other. And we maintain a strong normative skepticism about systemic justifications for acts that are troubling when viewed in isolation. This is what makes the problems of "roledifferentiated behavior" 205 in professional ethics interesting and troublesome. Choper seems to regard judicial review with the same ambivalence that we might view the successful defense of a guilty criminal or the acquittal of an innocent defendant through perjured testimony.
If these observations do not fully explain the confusing legal discourse about democracy, they at least provide a background against which another, more specific, factor may operate-the psychological and empirical difficulties we confront if we take seriously the political analogue of the "second-best." In economics, the theory of the second best holds that a regulatory scheme that is intrinsically inefficient when viewed in isolation may actually contribute to the overall efficiency of an economy because of the way it interacts with apparent inefficiencies elsewhere in the system. By analogy, as Martin Shapiro has observed, 20 6 a nonmajoritarian institution may contribute to the democratic functioning of an imperfect system.
The very possibility of second best often seems counterintuitive, however. The empirical uncertainty it engenders disturbs the intellectual repose and formal order we crave. And as applied to judicial review, it requires confronting the conceptual difficulties underlying any definition of "democracy."
Constitutional scholars typically respond by acknowledging the complexity of the issues and immediately offering their intuitive, common sense conclusion for or against judicial review. For example, Ely writes:
Sophisticated commentary never tires of reminding us that legislatures are only imperfectly democratic. Beyond the fact that the appropriate answer is to make them more democratic, however, the point is one that may on analysis backfire. The existing antimajoritarian influences in Congress and the state legislatures, capable though they may be of blocking legislation, are not well situated to get legislation passed in the face of majority opposition. That makes all the more untenable the suggestion.., that courts should invalidate legislation in the name of a supposed contrary consensus. Beyond that, however, we may grant until we're blue in the face that legislatures aren't wholly democratic, but that isn't going to make courts more democratic than legislatures.
2 0 T Ely's point is that, because the Court can only strike down legislation, not enact it, substantive judicial review is not responsive to antimajoritarian defects in the legislative process. He qualifies the assertion somewhat, but only in a note at the back of the book: "There may of course exist situations in which a majority cannot pass a law repealing old legislation because of minority resistance. While the critics' analysis of the "countermajoritarian difficulty" of judicial review seems incomplete, the proponents of fundamental rights adjudication scarcely address the issue. Tribe adopts what Choper and Ely label as the "sophisticated" position-that we have "an imperfectly antidemocratic judicial process and an imperfectly democratic political process.1 210 
B. The Justification for Democracy
The critics' shifts of focus between the system and individual actor, and their use of "majoritarianism" and "democracy" sometimes as synonyms and sometimes in contradistinction, manifest the dilemma of Madisonian democracy. Any hope for resolution lies in understanding how the scholars justify their commitment to democracy. As it turns out, the very justifications create and sustain both horns of the dilemma.
Consent
Professor Bork asserts that the Madisonian dilemma is resolved by the model of government embodied in the structure of the Constitution, a model upon which popular consent to limited government by the Supreme Court also rests .... Society consents to be ruled undemocratically within defined areas by certain enduring principles believed to be stated in, and placed beyond the reach of majorities by, the Constitution.
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His allusions to consent imply a justification for democracy: In the words of the Declaration of Independence, democracy is the means by which governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed." "Consent" refers either to the actual consent of members of the American polity or the "hypothetical consent" invoked by political philosophers such as Locke and Rawls. 213 Neither concept helps resolve the Madisonian dilemma. If actual consent means mere acquiescence, then the tradition of fundamental rights adjudication, however picaresque, establishes our consent to the practice. If consent must be informed and knowingly and freely given, then it is doubtful that any particular institutional practice can claim consent. 21 cannot ultimately resolve the Mad'sonian dilemma because the institutional arrangements involved-what kind of judicial review under what circumstances, or indeed, whether there should be any judicial review at all-are too detailed to be derived from any general theory. Consent may get you in the right ballpark, but once there it cannot distinguish among blades of grass. As Owen Fiss has written: Consent goes to the system, not the particular institution; it operates on the whole rather than each part. The legitimacy of particular institutions, such as courts, depends not on the consent -implied or otherwise-of the people, but rather on their competence, on the special contribution they make to the quality of our social life. Consent theories simply cannot resolve questions of institutional authority and competence.
Utilitarianism
Bork alternatively suggests a utilitarian rationale for democracy and for rejecting fundamental rights adjudication. He observes that every action individuals take to gratify themselves potentially impinges on the gratifications of others-there are no wholly "private" gratifications: "Every clash between a minority claiming freedom and a majority claiming power to regulate involves a choice between the gratifications of the two groups. ' 216 And he implies that majority rule, subject to constitutional limitations imposed by the majority itself, maximizes the net gratifications of society. John Ely makes this utilitarian justification even more explicit:
The way [utilitarianism] connects with democracy is fairly obvious. It is possible to assert, I suppose, that the best way to find out what makes the most people happy is to appoint someone to make an estimate, but no one could really buy this idea. The more sensible way, quite obviously, is to let everyone register her own preference . Of course, one can still argue that judicial review is likely to do more harm than good-for example, that courts will "overprotect" some individual rights at a cost to the majority's right to govern as it sees fit. But this position-or, for that matter, its opposite-calls, not merely for empirical study, but for criteria that determine the content of individual rights. Ely goes on to argue that the political process emulates an economic market by reflecting intensities of preference. 218 Leaving aside problems of intensity and other complexities suggested by social-choice theorists, 219 a utilitarian justification for democracy faces the liminal problem that utilitarianism is a highly controversial ethical theory. 220 One source of controversy arises because, as Ely notes, "[m]any, perhaps most, of us will feel so strongly about certain things that we will at some point be moved to qualify the utilitarian balance with a set of Thou Simply Shall Not's called 'rights,' 'side constraints,' or perhaps something else." 221 To qualify utilitarianism in this way, however, makes the Madisonian dilemma manifestly intractable, and Ely treats the qualification with obvious distaste. He does, however, wish to modify utilitarianism to deal with the following concern:
An ethical system that was serious in demanding only the greatest good for the greatest number would have to count as moral a world in which 75% of the people systematically promoted their own happiness at the expense of the other 25% in circumstances where no one could say there was a relevant difference between the two classes. Now this is more than a little troubling, in fact if uncorrected it is fatal .... 222 To remedy this defect, he proposes the equitable constraint of "representation-reinforcing" judicial review-the strict scrutiny of laws that are likely to reflect prejudice against minority groups.
Recall that Ely's Court must count as legitimate such goals as promoting morality and protecting the family, while discounting prejudice and dislike. 223 He implicitly defends the distinction in terms of an individual's right to "equal concern and respect"-the same impulse that presumably leads him both to adopt utilitarianism and to qualify it with the equitable constraint. This concern for the individual, however, ultimately renders indefensible a preference for a repbook Ely remarks that "nothing in the ensuing analysis depends on it." J. ELY, supra note 7, at 187 n.14.
218. Ely, supra note 182, at 408.
resentation-reinforcing rather than fundamental rights model of judicial review. First, a relatively minor point: Imagine a judge who is skeptical about high-sounding justifications for legislation disadvantaging unpopular minorities (say, homosexuals), who believes that such justifications are often rationalizations for, or at least infected by, prejudice, 224 and who doubts that courts can readily distinguish betweer. prejudice and "sincere" moral beliefs. 225 Assuming that the judge believes that courts should ever restrain the majority from imposing their prejudices on minorities, she would have to choose between erring on the majority's or the minority's side. If she doubted that she could successfully employ Ely's strategy (scrutinize the law and uphold it if the majority's moral beliefs are sincere), she might, prophylactically, just invalidate laws that she thought did not accord "equal concern and respect" to members of the minority group. The choice between Ely's approach and hers depends partly on one's intuitions about legislative psychology and judicial competence, and partly on the weight one gives the majority-gratification and individual-respect horns of the Madisonian dilemma. Utilitarian theory cannot determine the choice.
Ely's theory of democracy is much more fundamentally flawed, however. If utilitarian considerations determine the structure of constitutional government, the constitution must be blind to a nonutilitarian public morality. Although a utilitarian-based constitution surely does not prohibit a legislature from promoting morality, it has no basis for according that objective privileged status over giving vent to dislike. Both are simply gratifications. Thus, by introducing the distinction between morality and dislike or prejudice-a distinction essential to any equitable constraint upon utilitarianism and certainly necessary for representation-reinforcing judicial review-Ely creates a self-contradictory political theory. The short of it is that Ely's equi- ism, and judicial review to pull us in one direction or another-toward the interests of the majority or of individuals oppressed by the majority. But there can be no point of equipoise. The Madisonian dilemma is intrinsic to the liberal state-it springs into existence at the moment the state is created to mediate among individuals pursuing their self-interest-and is not susceptible to resolution within its own terms.
V. Our World, and Welcome To It?
The world of the fundamental rights controversy is inhabited by various institutions and actors, including the "majority," 2 27 state legislatures, the United States Supreme Court, individuals, and families. 2 28 The fundamental rights controversy is concerned with constraining the majority acting through their legislatures. Yet the scholars address neither legislatures nor the citizenry. They address only the Court -and, of course, each other. This is so typical of the genre as hardly to seem worth mentioning. But I would like to pause to ask why constitutional scholarship is so court-centered. 229 One explanation is that argument aimed at the people or legislatures is "political" and therefore not within the constitutional scholars' domain; but how does talk about sexual behavior, abortions, and the like become less political as it moves from public forums and 227. Some of the scholars acknowledge that "majority" is an oversimplification. See, eg., A. Biciar., supra note 10, at 18-19; J. ELY, supra note 7, at 4. None treats the concept as seriously problematic, however. Some scholars outside the fundamental rights controversy are more skeptical. Ct. 2671 (1980) . And despite the increasing activism of some courts, the state judiciary remains at the periphery of the scholars' vision.
229. Because the scholars focus on the Supreme Court it is worth considering how they view that institution. The proponents' Court is essentially Bickel's, described at the beginning of this article. See pp. 1065-66 supra. Their faith in the Court's ability to discern fundamental rights, as well as the critics' belief that the Court can carry out their affirmative agendas, are based not on the qualities of the individual Justices-who are not presented as extraordinarily wise, insightful, or virtuous-but on the Court's structure and processes. Curiously, none of the scholars looks behind the eloquent desc-iptions of the Court's processes with the eye of a political scientist or sociologist to consider how the institution actually operates. Curiously also, because it seems difficult to reconcile with the proponents' apparent confidence in the process, almost no one seems interested in the Court's opinions-in its explanations for what it is doing and why-as distinguished from its results. (Dean Wellington's detailed examination of the opinions in Griswold and Roe v. Wade is unique among the works reviewed above.) legislative lobbies to the courtroomt? Another explanation is that the scholars' expertise lies in the procedures for deciding these issues; but then one might expect procedural advice to be offered to other decisionmakers as well. A more plausible explanation lies in our professionalization and profession. We learned and we teach the law from cases. Many of us were law clerks-demi-judges-who (we would like to believe) shared in the power of judicial decision and who (in our innermost fantasies) aspire to our adopted fathers' 230 seats. For the present, our exercise of public power rests in the hope that some Justice will follow our advice.
Beneath these phenomena lies a more basic fact, however: We simply do not believe that "majorities" and legislatures are willing or able to engage in serious, reflective moral discourse. To be sure, Bickel and Wellington speak only of the judiciary's relative competence to engage in moral discourse, 231 and other commentators refer to a moral "dialogue" between the Court and other political institutions. 23 2 But if Bickel actually believed that the Justices are "teachers in a vital national seminar, 23 3 the contemporary literature evokes not a graduate symposium but an unruly classroom. The scholars' implicit message is that if the Supreme Court does not take rights seriously, no one will. This view of the legislative process as one of "public choice" rather than "social good" 23 4 is expressed most explicitly by Owen Fiss, a fundamental rights theorist:
Legislatures . .. are not ideologically committed or institutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values, but instead see their primary function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preference of the people-what they want and what they believe should be done. Indeed, the preferred status of legislatures under footnote four [of Carolene Products] is largely derived from this conception of their function. The theory of legislative failure, much like the theory of market failure, ultimately rests on a view that declares supreme the people's preferences. 2 5
The critics do not disagree with this assessment of legislative and popular processes. Ely describes representation-reinforcing adjudica-tion as an "antitrust" model that "intervenes only when the 'market,' in our case the political market, is systematically malfunctioning." 23 0 For Bork, " [t] here is no principled way to decide that one man's gratifications are more deserving of respect than another's or that one form of gratification is more worthy than another. . . . Legislation requires value choice and cannot be principled ....
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In sum, the scholars on both sides of the fundamental rights controversy share a profound skepticism about the possibility of public discourse about issues of principle, and ultimately, therefore, about the possibility of shared, reflectively held public values. 23 8 For a citizen of this world, "participation"-Ely's central and only acknowledged fundamental value 239 -is not participation in public discourse or community. It is, to use Bork's stark utilitarian language, the opportunity to vote to maximize one's gratifications. The citizens of this world lack the power-perhaps the only power that citizens, as distinguished from constituents, can exercise-of participating in meaningful debate over public values. 2 40 The proponents of fundamental rights adjudication relegate that function to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court. The critics either deny the very existence of public values or at most allow them on those rare occasions-1787, 1866-of constitutional revolution.
In this world-our world-the proponents of fundamental values adjudication seek to protect individuals against the force of an alien majority by cordoning off areas of personal privacy and autonomy, while in the absence of any principles that demand otherwise, the critics let the majority have its head. Wilkinson's and White's almost frantic concern to protect the family against threats from both sides 241 becomes comprehensible as an attempt to salvage the only extant intermediate association of any significance-that "haven in a heartless world" 242 -while other proponents see the traditional family as an institution readily available to the state as an instrument of social control. 243 These are not competing political stances. They reflect the con-tradiction embraced by any one (," us-what Duncan Kennedy has described as the "fundamental contradiction-that relations with others are both necessary to and incompatible with our freedom":
[I]ndividual freedom is at the same time dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is necessary to achieve it. Others (family, friends, bureaucrats, cultural figures, the state) are necessary if we are to become persons at all -they provide us the stuff of our selves and protect us in crucial ways against destruction ...
But at the same time that it forms and protects us, the universe of others ... threatens us with annihilation and urges upon us forms of fusion that are quite plainly bad rather than good. A friend can reduce me to misery with a single look. Numberless conformities, large and small abandonments of self to others, are the price of what freedom we experience in society. And the price is a high one. Through our existence as members of collectives, we impose on others and have imposed on us hierarchical structures of power, welfare, and access to enlightenment that are illegitimate ...
The kicker is that the abolition of these illegitimate structures, the fashioning of an unalienated collective existence, appears to imply such a massive increase of collective control over our lives that it would defeat its purpose. Only collective force seems capable of destroying the attitudes and institutions that collective force has itself imposed. Coercion of the individual by the group appears to be inextricably bound up with the liberation of that same individual....
Even this understates the difficulty. It is not just that the world of others is intractable. The very structures against which we rebel are necessary within us as well as outside of us. We are implicated in what we would transform, and it in us.
44
This is the world within which the fundamental rights controversy takes place. The Madisonian tension-between majority and minority, legislature and court-is just a partial image of the essential and irreconcilable tension between self and other, between self and self. This world is not entirely of our own making. In the broadest sense, Kennedy's description is of the human predicament; more narrowly, of a society we have inherited and over which we exercise little control. But if it would be arrogant to think that we could change the world, it would be even more irresponsible to act as if we couldn't. To continue the controversy over judicial review and democracy in the terms in which it has been framed is, in effect, to deny the contradiction and thus to limit both our vision and the possibilities for social change.
For those who share this sense, what then? I do not have an agenda, but I would like to mention several alternative strategies. One, which requires the least dislocation, is simply to acknowledge that most of our writings are not political theory but advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public good. In one or another form this has been the staple of legal scholarship and at least has the claims of tradition. Alternatively, we might turn to history and a broader sort of legal theory to understand where we are and how we got here. 245 That is also a respected academic tradition, though somewhat less familiar in legal scholarship.
Finally, the truly courageous-or the most foolhardy-among us might go the next step and, grasping what we understand of our situation, work toward a genuine reconstitution of society-perhaps one in which the concept of freedom includes citizen participation in the community's public discourse and responsibility to shape its values and structure. 246 Those who explore this route may discover that in escaping one set of contradictions they have just found themselves in another. But we will not know, until despair or hope impels us to explore alternatives to the world we currently inhabit.
